The remaining chapters each bring a deep understanding of their context to highlight a facet of economic sociology. At the same time, to judge this book on the strength of any individual chapter would be missing the primary reason to read it. The main attractiveness of the book is that its sum is greater than its parts. Not only does Dobbin draw links between the contributions as the book's editor to create this synergy, but many of the contributors actively frame their work in the context of the other chapters. The result is an intriguing dialogue.

Another strength of this book is the fact that it uses analyses that are historically and internationally comparative. Dobbin suggests that the insights of comparative work enrich the contributions, and I'm inclined to agree. In fact, one of the few additions that would have improved this book is a more direct attempt to broadly outline some future steps in the continued evolution of economic sociology.

This book should spark conversation around multiple levels, methods of analyses, and work that is rooted in differing approaches (e.g., interactionism, organizational ecology, historical analysis, social network models). Many of the chapters themselves are calls for reshaping research agendas. For example, Swedberg asks us to consider more seriously the relationship between legal institutions (property, contracts, inheritance, and "corporations as legal personalities") and economic behavior. Knorr Cetina and Bruegger call for greater attention to microsociological literatures (e.g., Goffman) and how they inform our understanding of market interactions. McLean and Padgett call for understanding economic networks and social networks as being on equal footing, rather than forcing a causal order between the two.

The Sociology of the Economy joins together scholars who are more diverse in their approaches than in their conclusions. I would recommend the individual chapters to economic sociologists and organization and management theory scholars but would suggest that reading multiple chapters will lead to a more fulfilling feast. I also found the book strong as a reading for graduate students. In fact, I have recommended this book to some of the students at my home institution, especially those who are interested in the variance of economic behavior across nations and time.

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Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational Decisions in Higher Educational Publishing.

Patricia H. Thornton. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004. 188 pp. $45.00.

I liked *Markets from Culture*, Thornton's new book, for theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons. First, she presents a complex, yet credible theoretical argument about the ways in which cultures and markets interact. Second, she uncovers a few real research gems about how institutional processes work in publishing, such as the consistent effect of founders on organizational decisions across very different market circumstances and institutional logics. And, third, she summarizes her arguments well and offers strong statements about their generalizability, both of which allow me to make practical use of the book in my own research.

The complex, credible argument presented across the first three chapters of *Markets from Culture* runs something as follows. Institutional logics focus organizational and entrepreneurial attention on different issues and solutions regarding the appropriate leadership, strategy, and structure for a firm. Logics are able to do so because they define what is meaningful, they detail the rules of the game, and embedded in logics are many solutions to perceived problems in an era. But Thornton argues that in spite of the power of logic, their effect is primarily a moderating rather than a mediating one. Logics influence the relationship between economic and social processes, processes that together affect key decisions such as leadership succession, acquisition strategy, and the choice of corporate form; that is, they shape the market of the era. Thornton argues that in publishing, up until the mid-1970s, an editorial logic moderated (and even suppressed) economic pressures on the firm by encouraging more functional or partnership type arrangements and symbiotic interdependent type acquisitions. These structures and acquisition patterns, in turn, were likely to decrease the effects of resource competition and executive turnover. After the mid-1970s, a market logic led to interpretations of economic pressures in a way that encouraged competitive interdependent type acquisitions and conglomeration, increasing the effects of resource competition and the likelihood of executive turnover.

Using very rich data, Thornton is able to uncover some real research gems about institutional effects at work in publishing. Her data include quantitative information on one-third of the population of publishing firms in the U.S. higher education market from 1958 to 1990 (230 out of 766 organizations, including both network and hierarchical forms). They also include qualitative data collected via a 23-question interview administered to 30 commercial publishers and two directors of university presses, and a 38-question interview with three investment bankers. In addition, Thornton relied on her personal knowledge of publishing acquired through her direct exposure to these firms and associations that developed while working with them. One research gem is the superlative way in which Thornton documents the two dominant logics in publishing. We have seen other institutionalists generate period variables and typify regimes, but unlike those other researchers, she relies on a much broader range of data to characterize publishing's institutional logics. In chapters 3 and 4, she combines quantitative data on organizational and industry changes with qualitative data on historical shifts and trends, along with personal knowledge about the importance of these events. This allows her to set up period variables for her logics, one running from 1958 to 1975, the other from 1975 to 1990, which she defends with sensitivity analyses using other period specifications and the interviews and historical research.

Another research gem is her reaffirmation and extension of her prior work on executive succession, some of it done with Willy Ocasio (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999). For instance, she finds a surprisingly strong positive size effect on succession under the editorial regime, compared with the market regime. She interprets this to mean that during the editorial period, straying from the very personal editor-author dyad as a means of growing business to just having lots of manuscripts increased the likelihood of executives either leaving for greener pastures or being fired. Thornton also finds that having a founder in power suppresses the likelihood of executive succession in the divisions or at the top of the firm regardless of the logic dominant in that era.

Yet another gem is Thornton's insight into the adoption of M-form structures and the use of acquisition as a strategy in publishing. Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley (1994) noted that conglomerate and M-forms were being dropped by firms in the 1980s and 1990s among the Fortune 500 (and medium-sized) companies due to de-institutionalization (challenges) to the form's utility. But in chapter 6, Thornton shows that in the publishing industry, hybrid M-forms were being adopted during the same time period because, according to the rules of market logic, the solution offered by the M-form seemed superior to those offered by the network/private firm model common up to that period. Similarly, in chapter 7, in her examination of the impact of institutional logics on acquisitions, Thornton shows that acquisition levels are completely unrelated to the number of imprints, using a distributor, or having a great deal of market competition when an editorial logic is in place, but they are highly, positively related to all three factors under a market logic. This very late use of acquisition as a legitimate strategy is surprising if we recall that strong capital markets had been established in the U.S. long before 1975, when the editorial logic's dominance ended.

On a practical note, as a researcher, I found Thornton's work useful because she was able to encapsulate her thoughts and findings in a very compressed fashion in chapter 8, and in the conclusion, she offered some sweeping statements that piqued me to debate her ideas. Table 8.2 (p. 127) summarizes her core argument and findings: rows represent the levels of analysis (individual, relational, and economic), and the columns represent the type of organizational decisions (leadership, strategic, and structural). The moderating effect of logics on positional variables in the case of all three decisions is quite consistent and robust ("universal," in her terms). In contrast, the moderating effects of logics on relational variables, while robust, vary by logic ("particular," in her terms). In other words, logics' effects on positional effects are more "universal" and on relational effects, more "particular." The impact of logics on economic variables' effects on decisions is a mixture of the two. This leads the author to argue that many organizational and market-level effects are strongly influenced by institutional logics, that is, they are cultural. The contingent effect of competition for resources on the types of organizational decisions is a key example. In her view, "... this finding is especially noteworthy because organization and economic theorists view competition as a universal material constraint (Williamson, 1975; Hannan and Carroll, 1992)—it is arguably the strongest test of a cultural theory of markets ..." (p. 133).

Yet this final claim seemed a bit strong to me. In truth, at the macro end, Thornton does not really have societal-level data that are collected independently from the data on the higher-education publishing marketplace to construct her institutional logics (with the exception of the prime interest rate). Although she attempts to address this by deriving her ideal-type analytic framework from societal-level logics in Table 3.1, on page 44 (Friedland and Alford, 1991), logics are identified, in part, by the types of transactions considered legitimate in a particular national market. In addition, at the micro end of the spectrum, she only has partial access to the recipes generated by institutional entrepreneurs, basing her sample on some 30-odd interviews.

Nevertheless, taken in context, *Markets from Culture* will be of use to a broad range of organizational scholars and researchers. The book should be useful for those organization theorists who wish to make strong arguments about the links between markets and organizational or entrepreneurial action; it will remind them of just how contingent such action can be. It should also be of use to strategists, because the book shows that in a very entrepreneurial business without state regulation, institutional logics or culture is a strategic variable, one that is readily changeable because its explanation does not depend on a theory of socialization (Swidler, 1986). Finally, the book should be of use to institutionalists, for not only does the author craft wonderful period effects, but she builds on the core of institutional theory by counterpointing Fligstein's (1996, 2001) research on markets from hierarchies and White's (2002) work on markets from networks. It was Fligstein (2001: 8) himself who wrote, "... the sociology of markets lacks a theory of social institutions. ..." This book helps to fill that gap.

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Third-Sector Development: Making up for the Market.
Christopher Gunn. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 218 pp. $45.00, cloth; $18.95, paper.

Third Sector Development develops the logic for and mechanism behind the growing importance of the "third sector" in the United States. Indeed, uneven investment by the private (first) sector, which often by-passes poor communities, and declining governmental (second) sector support have combined to make the third sector—non-profits, cooperatives, and credit unions—the fastest growing part of the U.S. economy. Increasingly, communities are turning to these entities to create jobs, produce local goods and services, and build surplus, which can be retained and reinvested locally. Non-profits, in other words, are becoming vehicles for building productive capacity rather than merely means for "cleaning up the mess" left by capitalist development.

Gunn vividly describes the scale, scope, and purpose of the emerging third sector in the U.S.; he develops a useful framework and typology for classifying such organizations; he also provides several interesting and instructive cases about specific third-sector organizations that bring the framework to life. Importantly, the book stops short of being a piece of advocacy by putting forward a sober assessment of the third sector's potential: generally positive in nature, but not a panacea. Indeed, the third sector, just like the first and second, is also subject to abuse, mismanagement, and scandal at the hands of egotistical donors and unethical leaders.

While useful and important, the book nevertheless falls short on several dimensions. First, by focusing exclusively on the U.S., Gunn fails to embrace the explosion of civil society and third-sector organizations globally, particularly in the developing world. Yet it is precisely in the developing world where corporate investment has been the most uneven and corrupt governments have served as a truly negative force. The book gently bows to the issues of globalization, poverty, and unsustainable development, but, given its focus on the U.S., it is never really able to address them head on.

The book also takes a rather conventional view of the three sectors. It assumes, for example, that the private sector will forever be destined to plunder the environment and ignore the poor in the quest for profit. Missing is any recognition of